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GENERAL APPEARANCE AFTER JUDGMENT:
THE DILEMMA OF RETROACTIVITY
By IRA H. LulvEY*
DESPITE modern adherence to substance over form, a pleader
guilty of no more than impatience can still lose his entire day in court
on the merits, where, as in California, distinctions persist between
"general" and "special" appearances.' At root is the undisputed
rule that a general appearance constitutes absolute submission to the
court,2 and a party so appearing waives3 all defects of personal juris-
diction.4 There is a sharp dispute, however, over the effect of a gen-
eral appearance after judgment.5 No court questions the existence of
subsequent personal jurisdiction.6 The question is whether a general
* Member, California and Nevada Bars. Clerk to the Supreme Court of
Nevada, 1965-1966.
1 See Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 2d 11, 129 P.2d 361 (1942);
O'Keefe v. Miller, 231 Cal. App. 2d 920, 921, 42 Cal. Rptr. 343, 344 (1965);
Bank of America v. Harrah, 113 Cal. App. 2d 639, 640-41, 248 P.2d 814, 815
(1952).
Federal courts have abolished this distinction. Orange Theatre Corp. v.
Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 740 (1944). FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides that: "No defense or objec-
tion is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections
in a responsive pleading or motion." It has been held that joinder of juris-
dictional with non-jurisdictional defenses will not constitute waiver of juris-
dictional defenses in the federal system, although, ironically, non-joinder may
constitute such a waiver. See generally 1A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 370, 509-25 (rules ed. 1950); 2A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 12.12 (2d ed. 1953); Pike, Some Current Trends in the Construction
of the Federal Rules, 9 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 26, 32-34 (1940).
2 Lacey v. Bertone, 33 Cal. 2d 649, 651-53, 203 P.2d 755, 757 (1949); 6
C.J.S. Appearances § 1 (1937); 5 Am. Jun. 2d Appearances § 5 (1962); 3A
WoRDs & PHRASEs, General Appearances, 350-51 (1953).
3 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 215 Ala. 557, 112 So. 143 (1927). But cf.
Scott v. Price Bros. Co., 207 Iowa 191, 200, 217 N.W. 75, 79 (1927), which said:
"It is not so much a question of waiver of special appearance or of the service
of notice, although such is the argument in many of the cases, as it is of the
moot character to which the question of effective service is reduced, when a
general appearance is entered."
4 Lacey v. Bertone, 33 Cal. 2d 649, 651-53, 203 P.2d 755, 757 (1949); Wells
Aircraft Parts Co. v. Allan J. Kayser Co., 118 Colo. 197, 201, 194 P.2d 326, 328
(1947); Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 393-99, 186 P.2d
884, 890-91 (1947).
G Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707, 710 (1966) (citing 6
C.J.S. Appearances § 20 (1937)); Muscek v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 25
Wash. 2d 546, 551, 171 P.2d 856, 859 (1946) (citing 5 Am. Jun. Appearances
§ 37 (1962)).
6 Board of Trustees v. Cheney, 160 Neb. 631, 633-36, 71 N.W.2d 195,
198-99 (1955); Ivaldy v. Ivaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 204-05, 59 N.W.2d 373, 374
(1953); Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707, 710 (1966); French v.
Ajax Oil & Dev. Co., 44 Wash. 305, 307-08, 87 P. 359, 360 (1906).
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appearance is also applied retroactively,7 thereby curing prior defects
of personal jurisdiction and rendering valid an otherwise "void" de-
cree. A substantial majority permits such retroactivity, but a dedi-
cated minority remains opposed.9 The problem generally arises inci-
dent to motions to vacate default judgments, 0 but also has occurred
in appellate" arguments.' 2 So severe is the breach (or confused the
situation?) that in adopting their respective positions, the opposing
camps rarely even refer to, let alone critique, one another.
13
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze these con-
flicting authorities to the end that (1) the minority is correct for
incorrect reasons and (2) the majority is incorrect for correct reasons
-i.e., those denying retroactivity have reached the proper conclusion
but weakened their position by faulty logic which leaves even their
leading cases susceptible to attack. Henceforth, retroactivity of per-
sonal appearance after improper default should be denied solely upon
specified grounds of public policy rather than a tortured application
of legal doctrines. Hopefully, such an enlightened approach would
7 Decisions vary in using terms "retrospective" and "retroactive." Com-
pare Bank of America v. Carr, 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 736-37, 292 P.2d 587, 593
(1956), with Godfrey v. Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 337-38, 40 N.W. 163, 164
(1888). See also Martin v. Justice Court, 44 Nev. 140, 190 P. 977 (1920);
Gallagher v. National Nonpartisan League, 53 N.D. 238, 243-44, 205 N.W. 674,
675 (1925). Since the subject at issue is a present action which alters the
current effect of a past event, the proper term would appear to be 'retro-
active." WmsBTERes NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2129 (Unabridged 2d ed.
1951). A retrospective act merely takes into consideration the past, but does
not alter it. Id. at 2130.
8 E.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 2d
842, 847, 155 P.2d 823, 826 (1945), and cases cited note 34 infra.
9 Muscek v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 25 Wash. 2d 546, 551, 171 P.2d
856, 859 (1946).
10 Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707, 710 (1966).
11 Bank of America v. Carr, 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 736-37, 292 P.2d 587,
593 (1956).
12 The problem of retroactivity appears to beset only direct attacks upon
default judgments. Where the attack is collateral, such as an attempt to
oppose enforcement of a judgment, the ordinary rules governing a direct
attack have no bearing. Kaufmann v. Cal. Mining & Dredging Syndicate, 16
Cal. 2d 90, 91-92, 104 P.2d 1038, 1039 (1940). The only question then at issue
is whether the invalidity of the collaterally attacked judgment affirmatively
appears upon its face. Crouch v. H. L. Miller & Co., 169 Cal. 341, 146 P. 880
(1915). Moreover, it may be further argued that it is impossible to make a
general appearance in a collateral attack, because the only relief being re-
quested as to the default decree is that it be made unenforceable for want of
personal jurisdiction. This is even less relief than is requested by a motion
to vacate for want of personal jurisdiction, which, pleaded alone, constitutes
a proper and therefore successful direct attack upon a judgment by special
appearance. Cf. Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707, 710 (1966).
18 See Ivaldy v. Ivaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 59 N.W.2d 373 (1953); cf. Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 215 Ala. 557, 112 So. 145 (1927), which held: "There are
a few cases to the contrary . . .but we prefer to follow the great weight of
authority, which is based, we think, on sound principles."
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be uniformly accepted, ending the present dispute and uncertainty.
The Dispute Examined
At the outset, the distinctions between general and special appear-
ances must be understood. It has been held that any action by a de-
fendant, other than an objection to the personal jurisdiction of the
court, constitutes a general appearance,1 4 even if he merely objects to
subject-matter jurisdiction. 15 There are similar holdings as to general
demurrers;16 motions to dismiss for want of timely prosecution; 1'7 re-
quests grounded upon the indulgence of the court for mistake, inad-
vertence or excusable neglect;' 8 service on opposing counsel of notice
of retainer and appearance; 19 the filing of answers20 or affidavits 21 on
the merits; resisting an interlocutory order;22 stipulating to a contin-
uance;23 and moving for a change of venue.24  The matter is one of
substance, not form.25  The controlling criterion is whether the de-
fendant raised any question, or sought any relief, which could be
granted only upon the premise that the court had jurisdiction of his
person.26 If so, he has made a general appearance, "regardless of how
14 United States v. Hoerner, 157 F. Supp. 563, 567-68 (D. Mont. 1957);
In re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 504-05, 64 S.E.2d 848, 856 (1951); Chagnot v.
Labbe, 157 Ore. 280, 69 P.2d 949 (1937); Dlouhy v. Dlouhy, 55 Wash. 2d 718,
721-24, 349 P.2d 1073, 1075-76 (1960); Duncan v. Tucker County Bd. of Educ.,
140 S.E.2d 613, 616 (W. Va. 1965).
15 Hale v. Campbell, 40 F. Supp. 584, 587 (D. Iowa 1941); Runnels v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 Kan. 571, 573-74, 195 P.2d 571, 573 (1948); Selz-
nick v. Dist. Court, 76 Nev. 386, 355 P.2d 854 (1960).
16 Storey v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 552, 556-57, 339 S.W.2d 112, 115-16 (1960);
Deich v. Deich, 136 Mont. 566, 576-77, 323 P.2d 35, 41 (1958); Murphy v. Mur-
phy, 261 N.C. 95, 100-01, 134 S.E.2d 148, 153 (1964).
17 Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 2d 11, 14, 129 P.2d 361, 363 (1942).
18 Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707, 710 (1966); Dell School
v. Pierce, 163 N.C. 424, 79 S.E. 687 (1913); Farmington Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Gerhardt, 216 Wis. 457, 257 N.W. 595 (1934).
'9 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Clintwood Bank, 155 Va. 181, 186, 154 S.E. 492,
494 (1930); McLaughlin v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 23 Wis. 2d 592, 596, 127
N.W.2d 813, 816 (1964).
20 Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 2d 636, 644, 116
P.2d 458, 463 (1941); Wetmore State Bank v. Courter, 97 Kan. 178, 155 P. 27
(1916); South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 210 S.C. 408,
416, 43 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1947).
21 Wilson v. Barry, 102 Cal. App. 2d 778, 781, 228 P.2d 331, 333 (1951);
Star v. Star, 127 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1953); cf. Erickson v. Emerson,
40 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.N.Y. 1941).
22 Miller v. Miller, 57 Cal. App. 2d 354, 134 P.2d 292 (1943); Howe v.
Lisbon Say. Bank & Trust Co., 113 Vt. 48, 49-53, 29 A.2d 816, 817-18 (1943).
23 People v. Estep, 6 ll. 2d 127, 128, 126 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1955).
24 Ferrier v. Morris, 109 Colo. 154, 158-59, 122 P.2d 880, 882 (1942). But
see Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co., 417 Pa. 135, 138, 208 A.2d 252, 253 (1965).
25 Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 15, 133 So. 609, 615 (1931); Gravelin v.
Porier, 77 Mont. 260, 273, 250 P. 823, 826 (1926); Northwestern Sec. Co. v.
Nielson, 191 Wis. 580, 585, 211 N.W. 798, 800 (1927).
26 Frohman v. Bonelli, 91 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290, 204 P.2d 890-93 (1949).
adroitly, carefully or directly the appearance may be denominated or
characterized as special.12
7
For purposes of the discussion to follow, it is immaterial how the
defendant confused or mistakenly combined his pleadings so as to
appear generally. Rather, it is assumed that for one reason or another
a general appearance has occurred and the defendant has been held
to have absolutely submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court.23
Our concern is when such submission is construed to have occurred:
that is, only prospective to default, or retroactively as well.
Majority Allowing Retroactivity
It is said to be the general rule that
a general appearance by defendant after final judgment waives any
and all defects and irregularities in the service of process and return,just as fully as it does where such appearance is entered before finaljudgment ....
As to the immediate parties to the action, a general appearance
validates a judgment that was theretofore absolutely void for want
of jurisdiction.29
For its rationale, the majority depends almost entirely upon the logical
inconsistency of a party professing to be outside the court's jurisdic-
tion while simultaneously requesting assistance which the court could
give only if it had jurisdiction 30 (though in reality the pleader may
merely be impatient to proceed with his defense on the merits). The
majority therefore forces a defendant to an election3' of objections.32
The singularity of argument relied upon by the majority is strik-
ing.3 3 Even early decisions looked only to inconsistency and bypassed
any discussion of the minority viewpoint denying retroactivity.3 4 In-
27 Proctor & Schwartz v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 376, 378, 221
P.2d 972, 973 (1950).
28 Brumleve v. Cronan, 176 Ky. 818, 197 S.W. 498 (1917).
29 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 215 Ala. 557, 112 So. 145 (1927), citing 4
C.J. Appearances § 64 (1916); see 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 20 (1937).30 Gilbert-Arnold Land Co. v. City of Superior, 93 Wis. 194, 195-200, 67
N.W. 38, 39-40 (1896), quoted with approval in Security Loan & Trust Co. v.
Boston & S.R. Fruit Co., 126 Cal. 418, 421, 58 P. 941, 942-43 (1899).
31 Taylor v. Sledge, 110 Tenn. 263, 265-69, 75 S.W. 1074, 1075 (1903).
32 Burdette v. Corgan, 26 Kan. 102, 104 (1881).
83 E.g., Wells Aircraft Parts Co. v. Kayser Co., 118 Colo. 197, 200-01, 194
P.2d 326, 328 (1947); Balfe v. Tumsey & Sikemeier Co., 55 Colo. 97, 100-01,
133 P. 417, 418 (1913).
34 A sampling of majority opinions illustrating this lack of discussion
includes: Crane v. Penny, 2 F. 187, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1880); Ryan v. Driscoll, 83
Ill. 415 (1876); Perkins v. Haywood, 132 Ind. 95, 105, 31 N.E. 670, 674 (1892);
Frear v. Heichert, 34 Minn. 96, 24 N.W. 319 (1885); Boulware v. Chicago &
A. Ry., 79 Mo. 494 (1883); Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, 66 N.W. 867(1896); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Schneider, 36 Neb. 206, 54 N.W.
257 (1893); Warren v. Dick, 17 Neb. 241, 22 N.W. 462 (1885); Yourke v.
Yourke, 3 N.D. 343, 55 N.E. 1095 (1893); Mayer v. Mayer, 27 Ore. 133, 39 P.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 19
January 1968] GENERAL APPEARANCE AFTER JUDGMENT 545
stead, majority attention focused upon what constituted a general
appearance, 5 the consensus being that any protest pointing to grounds
other than those of personal jurisdiction constituted a waiver of per-
sonal defects.3 6 Since general appearance before judgment consti-
tuted waiver by inconsistency, the equal inconsistency, and equal
waiver, of a general appearance after judgment was held indisput-
able.37
A somewhat weaker position was asserted as to the effect of a di-
rect appeal brought against an allegedly void judgment. Some courts
considered the taking of an appeal in itself as an unrestricted protest
to all occurring below and thus a waiver of prior defects in personal
jurisdiction.38 Others referred to "restricted" appeals based solely
upon questioned personal jurisdiction.3 9 California went a step fur-
ther and, in effect, divided its views on retroactivity between motions
and appeals.4
0
Motion to Vacate or Appeal: The California Distinction
California has from the first followed the majority rule and ap-
plied general appearances retroactively after default.41 In Bank of
America v. Carr,42 however, the court undertook an extensive review
of the problem and concluded that while "with respect to motions to
vacate judgment in the trial court both the cited encyclopedias state
that the weight of authority is in accord with the California cases
which hold that raising of nonjurisdictional matters cures defects of
1002 (1895); Mortock Ins. Co. v. Pankey, 91 Va. 259, 21 S.E. 487 (1895); Pfister
v. Smith, 95 Wis. 51, 55, 69 N.W. 984, 985 (1897); Coad v. Coad, 41 Wis. 23
(1876); Blackburn v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 578 (1875); Gray v. Gates, 37 Wis. 614
(1875); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257 (1871); Anderson
v. Coburn, 27 Wis. 558 (1871); Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis. 488 (1871).
35 Burdette v. Corgan, 26 Kan. 102, 104 (1881).
36 Alderson v. White, 32 Wis. 308, 310-11 (1873).
37 Balfe v. Rumsey & Sikemeir Co., 55 Colo. 97, 100-01, 133 P. 417, 418
(1913), citing Barra v. People, 18 Colo. App. 16, 69 P. 1074 (1902). See also
Crane v. Penny, 2 F. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1880); Boulware v. Chicago & A. Ry., 79
Mo. 494 (1833); Rogers v. McCord-Collins Mercantile Co., 19 Okla. 115, 91
P. 864 (1907); Gilbert-Arnold Land Co. v. O'Hare, 93 Wis. 194, 67 N.W. 38
(1896); German Mut. Farmers Fire Ins. Co. v. Decker, 74 Wis. 556, 43 N.W.
500 (1889); Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 Wyo. 501, 89 P. 1035 (1907).
38 Fee v. Big Sand Iron Co., 13 Ohio St. 563 (1820); Taylor v. Sledge, 110
Tenn. 263, 265, 75 S.W. 1074, 1075 (1903).
39 Clark v. Forbes, 34 Cal. App. 524, 168 P. 155 (1917).
40 Bank of America v. Carr, 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 292 P.2d 587 (1956).
41 Farmers & Merchants Natl Bank v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 2d 842,
846, 155 P.2d 823, 825 (1945); Thompson v. Alford, 135 Cal. 52, 54, 66 P. 983,
984 (1901); Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Boston & S. Riverside Fruit Co., 126
Cal. 418, 421, 58 P. 941, 942, modified, 127 Cal. 45, 59 P. 296 (1899); Tolle v.
Doak, 12 Cal. App. 2d 195, 199, 55 P.2d 542, 544 (1936); Shelley v. Casa De
Oro, Ltd., 133 Cal. App. 720, 723, 24 P.2d 900, 901 (1933).
42 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 292 P.2d 587 (1956).
service, '43 there was no reason to extend such retroactivity to a gen-
eral appearance on appeal.
The rationale offered by Carr for this distinction was that a de-
fendant has to include his substantive defenses on appeal or risk los-
ing them entirely, while being restricted to only procedural matters
below still allowed presentation of substantive arguments on appeal.44
The rationale of Carr appears correct and probably is, or should
be, the underlying motivation for the minority view denying retroac-
tivity in all post-judgment proceedings.45 The difficulty with Carr
is that its distinction between motions to vacate and appeals seems
without foundation: (1) Treating erroneously-broad pleadings in a
motion to vacate as a general appearance in effect deprives an other-
wise deserving defendant of ever having his day on the merits regard-
less of whether he might thereafter still have an appeal as to certain
substantive issues of law; and (2) the motion-to-vacate cases con-
sidered by Carr as firmly establishing retroactivity 46 all could have
been distinguished. There follows a review of these cases.
In Farmer & Merchants National Bank v. Superior Court,47 the
court was dealing with a probate matter and determined only that a
general appearance of the Alien Property Custodian, subsequent to
an order admitting a will to probate, retroactively validated the order
and made it effective. The Alien Property Custodian also filed an
express notice of waiver of any failure or omission of service and
appeared as amicus curiae on appeal to urge validation of the will's
probate. Thus the court's discussion analogizing the probate situation
to general appearances after judgment was at the least uncalled for
and at the most dicta:
In accord with the great weight of authority ... [citations], this court
has held that a general appearance made after entry of judgment has
the effect of curing any defect arising from the lack of jurisdiction
due to the failure to serve or notify a person of the proceedings ...
[citations], and a judgment based upon such an appearance is valid.4 8
In Thompson v. Alford49 the court faced the unique situation that
the defaulting party objected to having her default set aside, appar-
ently on the belief that so long as her default stood she could not face
trial because she had succeeded in having the judgment against her
vacated. The court said that by defendant's general appearance after
43 Id. at 735, 292 P.2d at 592.
44 Id. at 736, 292 P.2d at 593. To bolster its rationale, Carr concluded
that denying retroactivity upon appeal was "the nearly unanimous ... rule
in other jurisdictions." Id. at 735, 292 P.2d at 592. However, Carr presented
no authority for such alleged unanimity. See cases cited note 38 supra.
45 See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text.
46 See note 41 supra.
47 25 Cal. 2d 842, 155 P.2d 823 (1945).
48 Id. at 846-47, 155 P.2d at 826.
49 135 Cal. 52, 66 P. 983 (1901).
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default "[a]ny irregularity in the service of process was therefore
superseded.... [and] she became a party of record to the action,
whose default the plaintiff was entitled to have entered, in case she
should fail to appear therein."50 But in fact the trial court had va-
cated the judgment against her and simply neglected to set aside the
default.
In Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Boston & South Riverside Fruit
Co.,51 a default and final judgment in an action to foreclose a mort-
gage lien were entered against defendant corporation, which had an
interest in the mortgaged property. Thereafter defendant moved to
vacate the judgment on grounds that it had not been properly served
and also pleaded that the relief granted was in excess of that prayed
for. The trial court held that defendant's pleading constituted a gen-
eral appearance, retroactively curing any defective service, and denied
the motions to vacate.52 On appeal, the court affirmed the application
of retroactivity but reviewed the substantive argument that the judg-
ment was excessive, and, on rehearing, amended the judgment to con-
form with defendant's objections. 53 Thus defendant eventually did
receive a hearing on the merits.
Douglass v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co.,64 cited with apparent
approval by Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Superior Court,55
was an 1854 case in which the court upheld defendant's default in an
action for breach of contract and wages due and denied defendant a
hearing on the merits because defendant's motion to vacate for im-
proper service had included an allegation that defendant had a good
defense to the action, which pleading was held to be a general appear-
ance. The court cited no authority and its holding, in full, constituted
but two sentences:
It is clear that a party ought not to be allowed the benefit of any
proceeding, unless he also assumes the responsibility of it. His appear-
ance for one purpose, is a good appearance to the action56
In Tolle v. Doak,5 7 a probate proceeding, the protesting defendant
executor was found to have had actual notice of the creditor's pro-
ceedings involved "and had every opportunity to present any facts
tending to show that the creditor should not have the relief asked.15 8
In Shelley v. Casa De Oro, Ltd.,59 the discussion as to a general
5 0 Id. at 54, 66 P. 984 (emphasis added).
51 126 Cal. 418, 58 P. 941, modified, 127 Cal. 45, 59 P. 296 (1899).
52 Id. at 423, 58 P. at 945.
53 Id. at 424, 58 P. at 945.
54 4 Cal. 304 (1854).5 5 25 Cal. 2d 842, 155 P.2d 823 (1945).
56 4 Cal. 304, 306 (1854).
57 12 Cal. App. 2d 195, 55 P.2d 542 (1936).
58 Id. at 199, 55 P.2d at 544.
59 133 Cal. App. 720, 24 P.2d 900 (1933).
appearance retroactively waiving defects in service was dicta since
the judgment was set aside for other reasons.
The gist of the above review is that the court in Bank of America
v. Carr6° was not as bound to accept retroactivity in motions to vacate
as it believed. In showing its disdain for the concept of retroactivity,
it was not necessary for the court to draw what appears at best to be a
tenuous distinction between motions to vacate and appeals.
Nevertheless, Carr still appears to be the most recent California
pronouncement on the matter.
Minority Refusing Reiroactivity
The minority cases, which deny retroactivity, are equally reticent
as to any confrontation of conflicting rationale. 61 Generally, however,
decisions denying retroactivity turn upon arguments that (1) a gen-
eral appearance has no greater effect than service of process or no-
tice, and therefore can confer jurisdiction only subsequent to such
appearance; 62 and (2) a judgment rendered without personal service
is "void" and a total nullity, incapable of any effect or the power of
resurrection.63 Unfortunately, both arguments lend themselves to
ready attack.
64
The earliest definite denial of retroactivity 65 appears to be that of
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Valentine,66 still cited as
one of the leading minority cases. 67 In Godfrey, defendant moved to
set aside a default judgment on grounds that the return of published
summons was defective. It is unclear whether the defendant re-
60 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 292 P.2d 587 (1956).
61 Typical is a casual reference to the opposition found in Lore v. Citi-
zens' Bank, 51 Ariz. 191, 194, 75 P.2d 371, 372 (1938): "Appearance after
such a judgment [without personal jurisdiction] entered against a party,
whether general or special, will not cure a want of jurisdiction as to the
judgment previously obtained, general statements in the texts and decisions
to the contrary notwithstanding."
62 See Ivaldy v. Ivaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 211, 59 N.W.2d 373, 378 (1953).
63 Nevada Douglass Gold Mines v. Dist. Court, 51 Nev. 206, 273 P. 659
(1929).
64 See notes 83-93 infra.
65 However an intimation that such denial might be forthcoming occurred
three years earlier in Kanne v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 33 Minn. 419, 421, 23
N.W. 854, 855 (1855), where, in dicta, it was said that: "While there is no
doubt of the correctness of the proposition ... that if a party does not limit
his appearance to jurisdictional questions, but also calls into action the powers
of the court for other purposes, it is a general appearance, and he thereby
submits to the jurisdiction of the court thereafter, yet it may admit of doubt
whether the proposition was not misapplied in making such appearance relate
back in point of time so as to validate a void judgment previously rendered."
66 39 Minn. 336, 40 N.W. 163 (1888).
67 Board of Trustees v. Cheney, 160 Neb. 631, 635, 71 N.W.2d 195, 199
(1955); Ivaldy v. Ivaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 212, 59 N.W.2d 373, 377-78 (1953).
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quested any other relief,68 though the court discussed the record as if
he did:
The course of the moving party in thus seeking to have a void judg-
ment set aside,--to which relief he is entitled as a matter of right,-
but at the same time consenting and asking that the court shall now
hear and adjudicate upon the cause, may justify the court in enter-
taining the cause and proceeding as in an action pending in which the
defendant has voluntarily appeared. But in thus urging his legal
right, and thus invoking and consenting to the future action of the
court, the moving party should not be deemed to have conferred juris-
diction retrospectively, so as to render valid the previous judgment,
which, being unsupported by an authorized judicial proceeding, was
not merely voidable, but void, and in legal effect a nullity.69
By 1904, North Dakota7° considered a denial of retroactivity so
established a view that a citation of supporting authorities was
deemed unnecessary:
The fact that defendant has by this motion made a general appearance
in the action, which she did by asking to be permitted to answer
and proceed to trial on the merits, will not avail respondent. Such
general appearance did not relate back, so as to validate the void
proceedings. Its only effect was to confer jurisdiction over the person
of defendant from its date.73
Washington followed with a "bootstrap" theory to sustain a post-
judgment attack upon both jurisdiction and the merits,7 2 holding that
the jurisdictional protest was not weakened by the concurrent argu-
ment to the merits, and that the argument to the merits was not
fatally vague because a jurisdictional protest may stand alone.7 3
Nevada, too, vigorously denied retroactivity.74 In Nevada Doug-
lass Gold Mines v. District Court,75 it was held to be "self-evident
that [a general appearance] could not relate back to date of the
rendition of the so-called judgment so as to vitalize that which never
had life."76 Shortly thereafter,7 7 Nevada added that though defend-
ant may have entered a general appearance by moving to set aside the
default and judgment, "such appearance did not operate to vitalize
the antecedent proceedings."
7 8
68 The recited facts speak only of the motion protesting sufficiency of
the return of publication. 39 Minn. at 336, 40 N.W. at 163.
69 Id. at 338, 40 N.W. at 164-65.
70 Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D. 305, 100 N.W. 708 (1904).
71 Id. at 311, 100 N.W. at 711.
72 Bennett v. Supreme Tent, 40 Wash. 431, 82 P. 744 (1905), relying on
Woodham v. Anderson, 32 Wash. 500, 505, 73 P. 536, 538 (1903), which cited
no authority.
73 Bennett v. Supreme Tent, 40 Wash. 431, 434, 82 P. 744, 746 (1905).
74 In its most recent review of retroactivity, the Nevada Supreme Court
said that the subject was one in dispute, indicating a possible future reap-
praisal of the state's rationale for denying retroactivity. Doyle v. Jorgensen,
- Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707 (1966).
75 51 Nev. 206, 273 P. 659 (1929).
76 Id. at 212, 273 P. at 660.
77 Perry v. Edmonds, 59 Nev. 60, 84 P.2d 711 (1938).
78 Id. at 66-67, 84 P.2d at 713.
Recent decisions are equally direct. In Ivaldy v. Ivady,79 Ne-
braska reviewed six of what it considered the leading minority cases 0
and concluded that denial of retroactivity was "the correct rule."8 1
Four years later, in a rather impassioned dissertation which failed to
cite Ivaldy, Oregon repeated that a void judgment was impenetrable:
[W]hen one moves to vacate a decree void on its face as a futile
attempt at a judgment in personam, even if the motion be by a gen-
eral appearance, it will not infuse a void judgment with the vitality
which it lacks .... The validity of a judgment is determined as of
the date of its rendition and, if void, it remains so forever.8 2
The difficulty with the minority view as presently articulated is
that despite the obvious logic of its conclusion, its supporting argu-
ments, relying as they do on inapplicable legal doctrines, have failed
for 75 years to win majority approval.
First, the minority incorrectly attempts to present general appear-
ance as a philosophical substitute for notice, and thus encourages the
majority to a "waiver" rebuttal.
Though a general appearance may produce, in certain situations,
practical results identical to notice,83 this would seem merely coinci-
dental. Viewed for purposes of personal jurisdiction, general appear-
ance and notice are distinguishable activities. They depend upon ac-
tions of different parties. While notice basically is governed by the
behavior of the plaintiff seeking personal jurisdiction over his adver-
sary,8 4 general appearance depends upon the behavior of the defend-
ant over whom personal jurisdiction is sought.8 5 True, characterizing
79 157 Neb. 204, 59 N.W.2d 373 (1953).
80 Mills v. State ex rel. Barbour, 10 Ind. 114 (1858), which held that:
"The error might probably be waived by the appearance of the defendants to
the action, without any motion to set aside or quash the summons; as, indeed,
the issuing of a summons at all might be waived; but we do not think the
appearance of the defendants below, after judgment by default had been
entered against them, and making an unsuccessful motion to set aside the
default, will operate as a waiver of error." Doyle v. Wilcockson, 184 Iowa
757, 169 N.W. 241 (1918) (which held that parties could not stipulate to
acceptance of a decree void for want of subject jurisdiction); Godfrey v.
Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 40 N.W. 163 (1888); Nevada Douglass Gold Mines v.
Dist. Court, 51 Nev. 206, 273 P. 659 (1929); Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D.
305, 100 N.W. 708 (1904); Bennett v. Supreme Tent, 40 Wash. 431, 82 P. 744
(1905).
81 Ivaldy v. Ivaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 211, 69 N.W.2d 373, 377 (1953).
82 Wiles v. Wiles, 211 Ore. 163, 170, 315 P.2d 131, 134 (1957), wherein the
court cited extensively from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), a case
quite unrelated to retroactive application of general appearances after judg-
ment. See notes 112-18 infra.
88 For instance, where the general appearance occurs before judgment.
Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 395, 186 P.2d 884, 891
(1947); Tooz v. Tooz, 78 N.D. 432, 50 N.W.2d 61 (1951).
84 See Wood v. Kane, 143 Va. 281, 286, 129 S.E. 327, 329 (1925).
85 Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 395, 186 P.2d 884,
891 (1947).
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general appearance as notice should preclude retroactivity, because
notice implies that the party so noticed is susceptible only to all obli-
gations subsequent to such notice."" But such characterization would
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of bringing the defendant properly
before the court and, in effect, shift that burden to the defendant
himself.
Instead, if general appearance places a defendant within personal
jurisdiction of the court, it is not because such appearance constitutes
notice to defendant of the proceedings, but because defendant by his
general pleadings is implied to have waived notice.8 7 Viewed as a
waiver, which appears the logically correct view, general appearance
lends itself more readily to retroactive application. Courts denying
retroactivity frequently speak of general appearances in terms of
waiver.
88
Yet waiver is not the proper term. A strengthened minority
would abandon its discussion of notice and look to estoppel. If, as the
minority insists, a general appearance constitutes only future submis-
sion to personal jurisdiction, estoppel is the most accurate description
of the principle involved.89  The appearing defendant is estopped
from future jurisdictional protest. Yet, by continually referring to a
general appearance as notice or waiver rather than estoppel, it seems
that the minority courts are conceding that the appearing party has
relinquished something of the past, i.e. retroactively.
80 Pacific Coast Ry. v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. 103, 21 P. 609 (1889); cf.
Gilbert v. Lobley, 214 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tenn. App. 1948).
87 "Notice" is here presented as representing both notice and proper sum-
mons, though the two have been formally distinguished, summons being said
to require a formal action by the court. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Lobley, 214 S.W.
2d 646, 650 (Tenn. App. 1948).
88 Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D. 305, 100 N.W. 708 (1904); Bennett v.
Supreme Tent, 40 Wash. 431, 82 P. 744 (1905); Woodham v. Anderson, 32
Wash. 500, 505, 73 P. 536, 538 (1903). In general, "waiver" is the voluntary
abandonment of a known right. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In con-
trast, "estoppel" need not be intentional, in that here the crux is that one
party has caused another, in reasonable reliance, to change position (pre-
sumably to his detriment) and the inducer is thereafter precluded from deny-
ing his inducing conduct. Souter v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 273 F.2d
921, 925 (4th Cir. 1960). Waiver, therefore, may be said to turn upon an
actor's intent, express or implied, while estoppel turns upon a reactor's rea-
sonable reliance, actual or presumed. Unfortunately, the terms have become
loosely interchanged to the confusion of all involved. See G. Amsinck & Co.
v. Springfield Grocer Co., 7 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 1925).
89 By appearing generally, a party has in effect requested judicial assist-
ance inconsistent with a denial of jurisdiction. If such a denial is only barred
from future behavior, the party so appearing is simply being estopped from
thereafter denying his appearance. Estoppel is said to turn on detrimental
reliance. Flott v. Wenger Mixer Mfg. Co., 189 Kan. 80, 90, 367 P.2d 44, 51
(1961). Detriment, however, may here be implied from the court's having
spent effort in considering, and perhaps even granting, the substantive and
non-jurisdictional relief requested by the general appearance.
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Too, the minority rests ponderously upon the alleged impenetra-
bility of "void" judgments.90 Such reliance is misplaced, and seems
primarily the result of confusing want of subject-matter jurisdiction,
which is beyond the control of the parties9 1 and therefore cannot be
waived,92 with want of personal jurisdiction. The confusion is fur-
thered by interjecting the doctrine involving inconsequential defects
of jurisdiction, both subject-matter and personal, which may be over-
looked by a reviewing court, regardless of the parties, when equities
so compel.9 3
The Nevada Quartet: A Classic Example
The effect of the confusion of terms which besets minority opin-
ions on retroactivity is evident from the chaos apparent on a close
examination of the cases.
Considered a leading minority decision,94 Nevada Douglass Gold
Mines v. District Court9 5 held that denial of retroactivity was a "self-
evident" conclusion. No authorities were cited, but three Nevada
00 Nevada Douglass Gold Mines v. Dist. Court, 51 Nev. 206, 210, 273 P.
659, 661 (1929).
91 Jurisdiction of the subject matter means power to adjudicate the class
of cases to which the instant dispute belongs. State v. Smith, 6 N.J. Super.
85, 88-89, 70 A.2d 175, 176 (1949). It is a power acquired solely from the act
creating that court (see Samson v. Bergin, 138 Conn. 306, 84 A.2d 273 (1951))
and may not be conferred by the parties. Federal Underwriters Exchange v.
Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 541, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1943). In contrast, jurisdiction
of the person is gained by an individual being properly before the court pur-
suant to adequate notice and summons and thus subject to the court's deci-
sion within constitutional guarantees of due process. Mid-City Bank v. Myers,
343 Pa. 465, 23 A.2d 420 (1942). This is a requirement to protect the individ-
ual and therefore may be waived. See generally Haggerty v. Sherburne Mer-
cantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 395, 186 P.2d 884, 891 (1947).
92 Quare, however, whether even a judgment rendered without subject-
matter jurisdiction might not, in practical effect, be only voidable, since (1)
a judgment is generally presumed valid and (2) acquiescence by all parties
thereto would leave the edict, unless invalid upon its face and so seized upon
sua sponte by the court, unchallenged. Indirectly, the parties, by their lack
of protest, would be conferring jurisdiction where none was possible. Many
courts presume a judgment's validity. See generally Henderson v. Henderson,
85 Cal. App. 2d 476, 479, 193 P.2d 135, 138 (1948); Steffans v. Steffans, 408
ll. 150, 158, 96 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1951).
93 Crawford v. Richards, 193 Md. 236, 241-44, 66 A.2d 483, 485-86 (1949);
McGee v. Campbell, 202 Okla. 624, 627, 217 P.2d 174, 177 (1950). The court in
the latter case reasoned as follows: "[T]he grounds for vacating a judgment
as being void [are] that there has been a failure to do that required by law
to give the trial court jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause. Such
[grounds] cannot be held to include mere clerical errors committed in ef-
fectuating the requirements which give validity to the judgment rendered
thereon."
94 See Invaldy v. Invaldy, 157 Neb. 204, 59 N.W.2d 373 (1953); 6 C.J.S.
Appearances § 20, n.10 (1937).
95 51 Nev. 206, 27 P. 659 (1929).
96 Id. at 209, 273 P. at 660.
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decisions in the same general legal area preceded Douglass and ap-
parently had an influence.97 In Thatcher v. Justice Court,98 7 years
before Douglass, defendants asked to vacate a default judgment on
grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect. Upon denial, they
sought a writ of certiorari, arguing that the judgment had been ren-
dered without proper service. Plaintiff conceded service had been
improper, but argued that defendants' general appearance after judg-
ment, in pleading to excusable neglect, cured any want of personal
jurisdiction. The court disagreed:
It is not for want of process that relators attack the judgment, but for
the failure of the plaintiff or the justice [court] to comply with what
the court held in [Martin v. Justice Court, 44 Nev. 140, 190 P. 977
(1920) ] to be a jurisdictional requirement of the statute.99
In distinguishing between "want of process" and the defective process
then before it, and implying that only the former was susceptible to
subsequent ratification, that is, retroactivity, Thatcher could be said
to hold that no service of process is less of a defect than service of an
improper process. Thatcher's authorities appear equally incongruous.
For example, Thatcher quoted extensively from Iowa Mineral Co. v.
Bonanza Mineral Co.,100 an 1881 Nevada decision which appeared to
confuse minor clerical or procedural irregularities, which may be
overlooked by the court, with defects of personal jurisdiction, which
may be waived by the parties, and then went on to confuse both with
material defects of subject-matter jurisdiction, which can neither
be overlooked nor waived.10 ' By quoting Bonanza with approval,
Thatcher renewed this confusion.
97 Thatcher v. Justice Court, 46 Nev. 133, 207 P. 1105 (1922); Martin v.
Justice Court, 44 Nev. 140, 190 P. 977 (1920); Iowa Mineral Co. v. Bonanza,
16 Nev. 64. (1881). Two of the three cases were authored by the same jus-
tice who authored Douglass. (One was per curiam.)
98 46 Nev. 133, 207 P. 1105 (1922).
99 Id. at 137, 207 P. at 1106.
100 16 Nev. 64 (1881).
101 "There is a marked, and in many respects, an important and substan-
tial distinction, between defects in practical proceedings, which constitute
mere irregularities, or such as render the proceeding a total nullity and
altogether void. Where the proceeding adopted is that prescribed by the prac-
tice of the court, and the error is merely in the manner of conducting it,
such an error is an irregularity, and may be waived by the laches or subse-
quent acts of the opposite party; but where the proceeding is altogether un-
warranted, totally dissimilar to that which the law authorizes, then the pro-
ceeding is a nullity, and cannot be made regular by any act of either party."
Id. at 73.
However, Bonanza's discussion as to irregularities versus fatalities was
purely dicta and irrelevant in light of the facts at issue. In Bonanza, involv-
ing a disputed mining claim, plaintiff waited 3 years after filing his complaint
before serving process. Defendant demurred generally and followed with an
answer to the merits. Only then, 6 days after filing his answer, did defend-
ant formally move to dismiss the complaint for want of diligent prosecution.
The district court granted dismissal, but the supreme court reversed, holding
Thatcher also cited Martin v. Justice Court,102 where defendant's
general demurrer was received through the mail on the same day
that his default was entered. In opposing a reopening for defective
process, plaintiff argued that the demurrer constituted a general ap-
pearance which waived prior errors of personal jurisdiction. Without
citing authority, Martin held that the "uniform" rule denied such
retroactivity.10 3 Martin may be discounted both for accepting a minor-
ity view as a general rule, and for confusing jurisdiction of subject-
matter with personal jurisdiction.
In fact the lone consistency between Bonanza, Martin and Thatch-
er would appear to be a confusion between subject-matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction. 0 4
Nebraska's Accumulation
Equally confusing upon review is the list of minority authorities
cited in reliance by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Ivaldy v. Ivaidy.0 5
Of the six cases cited therein, 06 five turned upon apparent confusion
between subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, 07 and the sixth
that by his general demurrer and answer the defendant had waived any ob-jection to the "irregularity" of plaintiff's otherwise defective delay in prose-
cution. Bonanza could, therefore, be considered as supporting the rationale
of retroactivity. It is not without irony that Thatcher relied upon Bonanza
for an exactly opposite approach.
102 44 Nev. 140, 190 P. 977 (1920).
103 "That a party who appears generally by demurrer cannot subsequently
complain of want of proper service of summons upon him is a uniformly
recognized rule, but applicable only where such general appearance is made
prior to the judgment or other proceedings, questioned on account of such
defective service." Id. at 145, 190 P. at 978.
104 But see Doyle v. Jorgensen, - Nev. -, 414 P.2d 707 (1966). See also
Perry v. Edmonds, 59 Nev. 60, 84 P.2d 711 (1938).
105 157 Neb. 204, 59 N.W.2d 373 (1953).
106 Mills v. State ex rel. Barbour, 10 Ind. 114 (1858); Doyle v. Wilcockson,
184 Iowa 757, 169 N.W. 241 (1918); Godfrey v. Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 40
N.W. 163 (1888); Nevada Douglass Gold Mines v. Dist. Court, 51 Nev. 206, 27
P. 659 (1929); Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D. 305, 100 N.W. 708 (1904) (to
which Ivaldy referred as stating the correct rule); Bennett v. Supreme Tent,
40 Wash. 431, 82 P. 744 (1905).
107 Doyle v. Wilcockson, 184 Iowa 757, 169 N.W. 241 (1918), held that par-
ties could not stipulate to acceptance of a decree defective simply for want of
proper service. Godfrey v. Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 40 N.W. 163 (1888), ar-
gued that mixed pleadings after judgment should not deprive a party of his
right to demand a default be vacated for want of proper service: "The course
of the moving party in thus seeking to have a void judgment set aside,-to
which relief he is entitled as a matter of right,-but at the same time consent-
ing and asking that the court shall now hear and adjudicate upon the cause,
may justify the court in entertaining the cause and proceeding as thus urging
his legal right, and thus invoking and consenting to the future action of the
court, the moving party should not be deemed to have conferred jurisdiction
retrospectively, so as to render valid the previous judgment, which, being
unsupported by an authorized judicial proceedings, [sic] was not merely
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concerned post-judgment pleading 0 8 which in fact was sufficiently
limited to constitute only a special appearance.1 0 9
Oregon's Argument
Whereas Nevada was motivated by its own confused prece-
dents," 0 and Nebraska relied exclusively on confused foreign au-
thorities,"' Oregon, in Wiles v. Wiles,112 presented broad and impas-
sioned arguments to support its denial of retroactivity, but neverthe-
less continued to confuse subject-matter with personal jurisdiction."13
voidable, but void, and in legal effect a nullity." Id. at 338, 40 N.W. 164-65.
Nevada Douglass Gold Mines v. District Court, 51 Nev. 206, 27 P. 659 (1929),
was based upon Nevada cases which confused void with voidable defects in
jurisdiction; see notes 82-92 supra. Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D. 305, 310,
100 N.W. 708, 711 (1904), said: "[s]uch general appearance did not relate
back, so as to validate the void [for defective service] proceedings. Its only
effect was to confer jurisdiction over the person of defendant from its date."
Bennett v. Supreme Tent, 40 Wash. 431, 436, 82 P. 744, 746 (1905), said only
that "[a] party does not waive the question of jurisdiction or validate a void
[for want of effective service] judgment by a general appearance in support
of a motion to set the judgment aside." The Bennett court cited as lone
authority for this statement Woodham v. Anderson, 32 Wash. 500, 506, 73 P.
536, 538 (1903), which held a judgment "previously entered [upon defective
summons] was void [and] general appearance ... [after judgment] did not
validate the void judgment, but simply brought [defendants] into court, with-
out the necsesity of new process, to be dealt with thereafter as the law of
the case required." Woodham cited no authority for its denial of retroactivity.
108 Mills v. State ex rel. Barbour, 10 Ind. 114 (1858).
109 "The error of defective summons might probably be waived by the
appearance of the defendants to the action, without any motion to set aside
or quash the summons; as, indeed, the issuing of a summons at all might be
waived; but we do not think the appearance of the defendants below, after
judgment by default had been entered against them, and making an unsuccess-
ful motion to set aside the default, will operate as a waiver of the error."
Id. at 116. The court did not discuss whether the motion to vacate was made
solely upon grounds of defective service. There is reference in the opinion
to the court below having jurisdiction of the subject matter, but it is unclear
whether want of subject jurisdiction also was argued at the original motion,
thus constituting a general appearance, or only was mentioned after the lower
court already had found a general appearance and denied defendant's motion
to vacate the default.
110 See cases cited notes 94-104 supra.
111 See cases cited notes 105-09 supra.
112 211 Ore. 163, 315 P.2d 131 (1957).
13 Five cases cited by Wiles appear equally confused. Langston v. Nash,
192 Ga. 427, 429-30, 15 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1941), expressly dealt with jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter. In re Hanrahan's Will, 109 Vt. 108, 121-23, 194
A. 471, 477-78 (1937), involved the appointment of a temporary guardian over
Hanrahan pursuant to an insanity hearing at which Hanrahan neither was
present nor had notice. Subsequently, Hanrahan sought to have the decree
vacated and pleaded lack of notice and that he was not insane. The court
called this mixed pleading only a special appearance, then added that "a 'judg-
ment' rendered without notice or appearance is no judgment at all. It is not
merely erroneous, irregular, or voidable. Upon the plainest principles of
natural justice, and under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is absolutely void."
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Also, by seeming to rely heavily on Pennoyer v. Neff,11 4 particularly
for the proposition that the validity of a judgment can be ascertained
only at the time of rendition,1 15 Wiles confused a defendant's ability
to waive defects in personal jurisdiction 16 with the preclusion of a
court from taking advantage of subsequent unrelated acts of a de-
fendant over whose person the court originally lacked jurisdiction.1 1 7
Summary: Result or Rationale
Having concluded that the minority view must fail for want of
legal logic propounded by leading cases, we next turn to what seems a
heretofore neglected point: whether denial of retroactivity is neces-
sary to serve justice regardless of lack of support from traditional
legal doctrine.
These doctrines seem to favor retroactivity: e.g., since waiver of
defects in personal jurisdiction is unanimously permitted as to general
appearance before judgment, the majority appears correct in finding
Id. Hanrahan thus confused want of subject with want of personal jurisdiction.
Obviously, the Hanrahan court was moved by the particular equities involved,
which it recited at length. It was Hanrahan that first cited Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877), for the proposition, inapplicable in Hanrahan, that a judg-
ment's ultimate validity is determinable only at the moment of its rendition.
Id. at 121-23, 194 A. 477-78.
Riverside Mills v. Meneffee, 237 U.S. 189 (1914), the third case cited by
Wiles, did not involve waiver; rather it held that the mere fact a corporate
executive personally resides in a jurisdiction does not automatically give
that state in personam power over the corporation, where no business or
contact is conducted within the forum. In Martin v. Cobb, 77 Tex. 544, 546,
14 S.W. 162, 163 (1890), the court discussed the void nature of judgments ren-
dered without personal jurisdiction, but also noted that "Etihe record does not
show that the defendants filed the post-judgment general motion, or that it
was done by their authority." Thus defendants never waived anything.
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873), also dealt with a factual lack
of waiver, a guardian ad litum being appointed for an infant without proper
notice. No subsequent appearances were made by the infant.
114 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
115 Wiles v. Wiles, 211 Ore. 163, 168, 315 P.2d 131, 133 (1957), quoting
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877): "The judgment, if void when ren-
dered, will always remain void; . . . the validity of every judgment depends
upon the jurisdiction of the court before it is rendered, not upon what may
occur subsequently."
116 See notes 91-94 supra.
117 Pennoyer, in speaking of ascertaining a judgment's validity only at
the time of its rendition, was concerned with judgments in personam as dis-
tinguished from those in rem and held that a judgment could not be effected
in limbo against a party outside personal jurisdiction, with hopes that the
party subsequently might acquire property within the forum, which then
might attach that property in rem. Thus the validity of a judgment in rem
against an absent party is to be determined by the presence of property
within the jurisdiction at the time of the judgment. In contrast, the subse-
quent entry of the defendant and submission to personal jurisdiction by
waiving defects of prior service would constitute an entirely different situa-
tion.
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no doctrinal grounds for distinguishing general appearance after
judgment. It is in attempting to attack such a doctrine rather than
to distinguish pre- and post-judgment pleadings that the minority
logic breaks down.
Rather, general appearances after judgment should be distin-
guished as a matter of public policy upon the following rationale:
A protest to lack of personal jurisdiction was traditionally a plea
much disfavored by courts, which considered it "purely dilatorious. 118
Such a plea was strictly construed, and was deemed "waived" at the
slightest defect in the pleadings, particularly in the formative, for-
malistic years of judicial development. 1 9 The decisions found an
obvious inconsistency of a party pleading that he was outside the court
but concurrently asking court assistance and readily penalized such
mixed pleadings by depriving that party of his protests to personal
jurisdiction. Thus arose the distinction between general and special
appearances.
Viewed simply as a penalty for inconsistency, the implied waiver
of a mixed or general pleading takes on sharply different attributes
after judgment. Considered before judgment, the penalty only
amounts to a loss of a jurisdictional argument grounded in improper
notice, the function of which was to bring the party before the very
court where he now stands. The party still has his full day in court
upon the merits. Viewed after judgment, however, the penalty for a
mixed pleading can fully deprive the negligent pleader of his entire
day in court.120 This is too harsh an imposition for so slight an im-
propriety as procedural impatience.' 2 ' The minority appears to have
reached the correct result in denying retroactive application to genera]
appearances after judgment.
1Is Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 85, 103 P. 317, 318 (1909).
119 See Clark v. Forbes, 34 Cal. App. 524, 525, 168 P. 155, 156 (1917).
120 For example, a default entered without personal jurisdiction and pro-
tested solely upon this ground must, upon an affirmative finding of the defect,
be set aside. If, however, the defendant combines pleadings and also requires
a setting aside for mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, he has made
a general appearance and, under the majority rule, the jurisdictional defect
is retroactively waived. The court, therefore, no longer is under a mandate
to vacate. Rather, in its discretion, it now may find there was no excusable
neglect and refuse to set the default aside. Such discretion, if not abused,
will be upheld upon appeal. The defendant will have suffered a judgment
on the merits without ever having had his day in court.
121 In its essence, the erroneous pleading is simply a matter of impatience,
since there is nothing to preclude a defendant from first seeking vacation of
the default solely upon grounds of defective service and, being denied, then
asking the court's indulgence for excusable neglect or disputing the decree
on substantive matters.
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The Problem of Illogic
Conceding that the minority has reached the correct result, the
difficulty is that its illogical arguments serve to obscure the basic
issue of whether or not possible denial of a defendant's trial on the
merits is too harsh a penalty to impose for errors in pleading. Indeed,
minority arguments do occasionally allude to such considerations 2
but, more often, encourage direct and successful attack upon doctrinal
grounds, perhaps even reinforcing the majority view that retroactivity
is logically sound and does not even warrant reexamination.
If the minority were to discard its present rationale and replace
it with a clear discussion on the harshness of forcing retroactive
waiver upon a hapless defendant, the majority soon might be con-
verted to a denial of retroactivity.
Factual inconsistency is no longer abhorred in pleadings. 23 Jus-
tice upon the merits, not upon procedural niceties, is the goal of mod-
em adversary proceedings.' 24 Federal courts already view procedural
errors with tolerance, so long as the opposing party is not unduly
prejudiced. 125 Therefore it would seem that distinctions between
general and special appearances are anachronisms. Pending the over-
all abolition of such distinctions, however, the effect of erroneous
pleading as depriving a defendant of his jurisdictional arguments
should not also deprive him of his day on the merits.
122 In Bank of America v. Carr, 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 737, 292 P.2d 587,
593 (1956), the court stated: "If the defendant is restricted in the lower
court to the presentation of his defense as to the jurisdiction of the person
only and is unsuccessful he still has the opportunity to raise his substantive
defenses by appeal from the judgment, whereas failure to raise them in the
court of last resort would be definitely fatal, so that the presentation of the
jurisdictional matter on appeal would be more hindered by the restriction
[of retroactivity] than the presentation in the trial court."
Similarly, in Simensen v. Simensen, 13 N.D. 305, 311, 100 N.W. 708, 711
(1904), the court stated: "[D]efendant never was summoned to appear and
answer plaintiff's complaint, and hence never had her day in court. This she
had an absolute right to, and no lapse of time would bar such right. We deem
the citation of authorities unnecessary upon a proposition so well settled."
123 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e). See also Julian v. Carpenter, 65 Ariz.
157, 176 P.2d 693 (1947); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954); Tabloid Lithographers v. Israel, 87 N.J. Super. 358,
209 A.2d 364 (1965).
124 "The intent and effect of the federal rules is to permit the claim to
be stated in general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over
mere form of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which
the codes permitted that served either to delay trial on the merits or to pre-
vent a party from having a trial because of mistakes in statement." ADVISOR
CommTTE ON RULES FOR CIVM PROCEDURE, PRELnuNARl DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 8 (1954). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi
v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
125 See note 1 supra.
[Vol. 19
January 1968] GENERAL APPEARANCE AFTER JUDGMENT 559
Conclusion
Where distinctions remain between general and special appear-
ances, a majority of courts hold that general appearances after judg-
ment serve to waive defects of personal jurisdiction retroactively
and render the original judgments procedurally valid. An entrenched
minority, however, insists that the original judgment, lacking "juris-
diction," is void-a total nullity-and therefore is incapable of sub-
sequent resurrection. In so arguing, the minority confuses want of
subject-matter jurisdiction, a matter beyond the control of the par-
ties, with want of personal jurisdiction, which can be waived, and ex-
poses its logic to direct attack.
Nevertheless, the minority appears to have reached the right re-
sult. Allowing retroactive application of general appearances after
judgment imposes too harsh a penalty upon a defendant for no greater
offense than overanxious pleadings, and could deprive defendant of
his entire day upon the merits. As a matter of public policy, general
appearances after judgment should not validate previously void judg-
ments, but should merely subject the appearing party to subsequent
proceedings without further service. This still would permit defend-
ant an opportunity on the merits and would be consistent with modern
concepts of ordered substantive justice, aided rather than hampered
by procedure.

